No Such Thing As A Free Lunch

 

Graham Hay

1995

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Abstract

In his criticism of the ideological consequences of the state funding of the arts, Gough (1995) omitted special-interest groups and showed no awareness of the economic links between community and professional markets.  In contrast, corporatism theory stipulates that shared ideologies are a precondition for negotiated exchanges between the state and arts.  These exchanges produce the funding system designed to foster community participation and artistic excellence by professional artists.  Further application of the theory detected institutional causes of declining professional artists' real income and state sponsorship of the arts.  In response, this paper recommends greater attention to the links between the quantity aspects of professional arts training and incomes.

 

 

 

 

Democracy is the key to cultural value...

(Creative Nation, 1994, p. 1)

 

 

 

I think the job of democracy in the field of art,

is to make the world safe for elitism. 

Robert Hughes (cited in Slattery, 1995, p. 23)

 

 

 

 

 

INTRODUCTION

This paper is designed to satisfy the requirements of an Honours degree and, through its circulation within the arts community, create a greater appreciation of the positive impact of professional associations on artists' incomes.

 

The paper is the outcome of a search to find an adequate theory to contextualise an experiential knowledge of the arts, and to critically evaluate Gough's (1995a) paper "The Faustian bargain: Government sponsorship of the arts" in Agenda, Volume 2, Number 2, pages 159-167 (copy in Appendix.1).  Corporatism is superior to pluralism, and pure elitism theories, in explaining the artist-state relationship, a relationship which Gough criticises for being detrimental to artists.  Corporatism's strength lies in emphasising the importance of the relation between groups and the state to explain political and economic outcomes.  The examples chosen for specific exploration are inter-art form relationships, funding policy, arts ideology, and membership.

 

For the purposes of this paper, “state" is used very loosely in reference to both the Commonwealth and State governments, as, for all intents and purposes, they work together but at different levels.  The arts in Western Australia, including the Western Australian Department for the Arts (WADFTA), annually receive over $3.3 million from the Australia Council (Australia Council, 1994, p. 113), and the Australia Council is legally required to take into account "the policies of State Governments, . . . so far as it is practicable to do so" (Australia Council Amendment Bill 1988 (enacted in 1991), Section 12-13).

 

Special interest groups are defined as registered, membership-based, non-profit organisations dedicated to promoting and protecting the interests of a specific group of people or cause.  They can range in size and purpose from the National Association for the Visual Arts to the Perth Potters Club.  Within the Western Australian arts there are approximately 2,000 such associations, councils or groups.

 

THEORETICAL considerations

We now turn to consider the various theoretical frameworks available within which to consider Gough's paper before focusing on corporatism.  Underpinning Australian multicultural policy is pluralism, which argues that all cultural differences have validity and people can influence the neutral state simply by publicly indicating their political preferences in voting or joining a special interest group.  These groups would modify the state's totalitarian tendencies by conveying these preferences to the state (Cawson, 1986, p. 13-19).  Yet in the arts, pluralism does not adequately explain why fine artists, representing a smaller proportion of the population relative to the crafts (ABS, 1991, p. 5), receive preferential treatment by the state (WADFTA, 1993/94, p. 85).

 

Elitist theory focuses on a political class, which dominates society, and a political formula, or rhetoric, that guides and legitimates the elites' domination (Albertoni, 1985, p. x).  Within the arts, the élite are those who control the institutional education, collection and promotion of artists and their work.  The quest for an undefined "excellence" is the political formula.  This theory proved valuable in explaining the apparent preferential treatment given to a small and select group in the arts (Hay, 1995a, p. 9-11), but was weak in explaining the nature of the dynamic relationships between elite controlled groups.

 

Neither of these theories successfully conceptualised the many special interest groups nor the differences in their ability to gain resources and influence state policy.  Similarly, Gough's (1995a) paper completely omits these groups from his analysis thus ignoring the substantial financial support these groups also receive from the state.  Consequently, this paper will focus on three important characteristics of the corporatism model: reciprocity of group-state relations; shared ideologies; and, monopolistic membership.

 

The important difference between pluralism and corporatism is that, while pluralism may involve the state undertaking extensive consultation with all groups, corporatism occurs when both the state and a small number of groups seek each other and negotiate the sharing of power from oppositional, functional positions but within shared ideologies (Grant, 1985, p. 3).  Therefore, corporatism is associated with 'contractual exchanges' between the state and group élites, who are able to use various institutional resources and structures to ensure compliance by their members (Scholten, 1987, p. 4).  Within these groups, various social and political rewards and sanctions are used to enable their élite to strategically mobilise, and use, their collective power to influence their relationships with the state and other groups.  However, to do this, a degree of compulsory membership is needed to increase the élites' influence over its group members.  The traditional model of this is compulsory unionism, but other groups appear to be able to exercise similar influence via the state granting the group a type of territorial monopoly within an occupation.  Corporatism also focuses on the way special interest groups operate as governments in their own right, with internal hierarchies of organisation and policy development.  Thus, their relation with the state contains inter-governmental aspects and a "fusion of the processes of interest representation and policy implementation" (Cawson, 1986, p. 18).

 

Gough's omission of these groups is not surprising because, historically, they and their leaders, are not open to public scrutiny and, therefore, academic documentation.  However, corporatism provides an appropriate theoretical framework to examine these groups, within the general parameters of Gough's discussion of the relationships between society, patrons, artists and the state. 

Closely aligned to corporatism theorists are those who examine consociationalism aspects of inter-group relations.  Consociationalism concerns the relationships between subcultures that may be segregated and oppositional in nature, be it on social, economic, political or cultural grounds.  These subcultures often share similarities in the way they have stable internal class and status structures, and unique but homogenous social values and ideologies.  In addition, they have developed close knit élites within their associations, and influential networks within political parties, the civil service and institutions (Scholten, 1987, p. 4).

 

Differences in state funding of the various art forms indicate the relative ability of their subcultures to compete for grants.  Based upon this perspective, Figure. 1 suggests that the performing arts subcultures appear to be experiencing a decline in influence (vis-a-vis other subcultures) and/or importance to the state.  This is expected, given: that Australian performing arts is predominantly Euro-centric in nature; declining levels of European immigrants; and, the state's push to redefine Australia as a multicultural nation.

 

Source: Australia Council Annual Report 1989/90 & 1993/94

Source: Australia Council Annual Report 1989/90 & 1993/94

 

The increased funding of preferential groups, or arts agencies, is a negotiated exchange beneficial  to both them, the WADFTA and the Australia Council.  These arrangements enable a circumnavigation of state funding and staff limits, and the continuation of important but politically sensitive work.  For example, the Labor government funded the Artist Foundation of WA to employ a public art officer, following a Trades and Labour Council's black ban on public art and a heated public meeting of artists.  Figure. 3 indicates the financial scale of this type of creativity, with funding differences between the Crafts Council of WA (CCWA) and NAVA purely reflecting their relative ages.  NAVA's inexperience is also indicated in that it sells information to the Australia Council (NAVA, 1994 Annual Report) rather than perhaps using it as a justification for its own involvement in policy development.

Source: Craft Council of Western Australia Annual Reports (various)

                National Association for the Visual Arts Annual Reports (various)

 

As these groups become more dependent upon recurrent state funding, they have a vested interest in aligning their activities more closely with the funding body's objectives.  Alternatively, these negotiated transactions would not have occurred without similar ideologies.  One way to guarantee these shared ideologies is by employing the same people: in the last six months the CCWA has 'poached' a Department for the Arts officer and NAVA has recently appointed a new Executive Director fresh from the Australia Council.

 

An Arts-state CONTRACT

Academic experience is a critical factor in the spread of shared ideologies, a necessary precondition for the emergence of arts-state "contractual exchanges".  Berger defined academia as a class emerging as a result of changes that created the "knowledge industry" in society.  Its members' social position rested upon "the manipulation of symbols rather than on the manipulation of things" (cited in O'Brien, 1978, p. 59-60).  Like other groups, academia has developed its own self-justifying ideology, is internally stratified and headed by the "cultural élite", with a power centre in universities supported by publishing houses, periodicals and foundations.  This group is closely linked to the communications media, as well as the welfare and regulatory arms of the state.  In this, Berger shares Gough's awareness of the linkages between academia, the media and government departments, and demonstrates a distinct corporatism perspective.  This group sees itself in a class struggle for power and privilege against the élite of the old business class ideologically opposed to capitalism and democracy (because like the business class, it is a minority).  Many of these values still underpin current art theory and practise today.  Gough (1995a) also identified similar avant-gardé forces seeking to generate a "fundamental transformation of society" (p. 163).  These values incorporate a pessimistic social and environmental perception, justifying state intervention and expansion of employment and power for its members.  As Berger (1978) pessimistically sums it up:

 

[t]he 'discovery' of every new group of deprived people in society legitimates the inauguration of programmes that benefit [][this group] - no matter whether they also benefit those on whose behalf the programmes are supposed to exist (O'Brien, 1986, p. 62).

 

As these views are prevalent among arts administrators, art group leaders and professional artists alike, who are predominantly tertiary educated, this suggests that universities are instrumental in creating common ideologies in the arts.  The presence of a significant number of academics on national and state groups' elected committees reinforces this argument.

 

We will now briefly examine the history of national arts-state "contractual exchanges" in an endeavour to place Creative Nation in its proper perspective.  Gough (1995a) is incorrect in implying that the state came "blundering into the field" only twenty years ago.  In fact, the state established the Commonwealth Literary Fund to provide "pensions for needy writers" as early as 1908, and the early Australia Council for the Arts, established in 1968, was an advisory board (Australia Council, 1991, p. 9).  That the state was willing to fund these activities suggests a receptive attitude that enabled artists' representatives not only to inform the state about the arts but also to gauge the general concerns and plans of the state, relative to its own needs.

 

The lobby for and creation of art legislation is a lengthy and costly process; the recent establishment of VI$COPY is a case in point.  The key politicians, and their advisers, have to be dragged away from other lobby groups, day-to-day crises, the election cycle and administrative duties, to focus decisively on the proposal.  Concurrent to this, the issue has to be canvassed, and massaged, down and up within the relevant departments and through the overlapping committees, without being stalled by party divisions.  At the same time, the group represented has to be constantly informed so it doesn't fragment into conflicting opinions.

 

In a more general sense, legislation is a formal symbol of contractual agreements reached by the state and large groups of society.  In tracing the history of the arts-state contract the key years are 1968-74, when the terms and conditions of the current Australia Council Act were negotiated prior to proclamation, and 1987-91, when a number of minor amendments to the Act were drafted and passed.  The former period involved artists gaining a policy- formulating and grant-making statutory authority, which they partially controlled (see Australia Council Act, 1975, Section 9).  The second period involved artists re-negotiating greater control over the statutory authority, with the amending Act specifically replacing state representatives on the Council with "community interest representatives" who: "(a) in the Minister's opinion, understood [...] the interests of the general community in relation to the arts; and (b) [are] not a professional artist [...]" (Australia Council Amendment Act, 1991, Section.2).  This legislative distinction between community and professional artists is useful to keep in mind.  Compared to these major legislative outcomes, Creative Nation was not a major event, did not signal a substantial increase in Australia Council funding (see Figure. 7) and was not rooted in law and so could be dismantled easily (Gough, 1995a, p. 164).

While Gough (1995a) alerts us to the unforseen political implications of the contract, it is useful to summarise what were its original terms.  Section 5 of the Australia Council Act (1975) stresses that the Council foster the personal awareness, appreciation and practise of the arts within the community.  In addition, the Council was to publicise and reward artistic "excellence" and "the expression of a national identity".  Thus, the Australia Council was designed to reverse a 'cultural cringe' about Australian culture and the loss of many of the most talented artists overseas.  These contrasting democratic and élitist requirements underpin the inherent divisions of opinion within the arts on funding issues.

 

Unfortunately, these separate, private (artist expression) and public, (nationalistic) objectives have resulted in systems that allow the state to influence artistic content.  In his article, Gough (1995) questions Phillip Adams' argument that Australian intellectuals' and artists' habitual larrikinism is proof that state sponsorship does not corrupt.  Gough argues convincingly that, with the current "more purposeful drive towards national goals", intellectuals' and artists' ridicule has increasingly focused on the "Left's favourite targets" (p. 162-163).  What Gough suggests is that, as a result of the current nature of state sponsorship of the arts in Australia, the arts community's ideologies swing toward the political party in power.  He also argues that the blame does not rest solely with Labor, as a change in government would not "make any difference to the system of patronage" (p. 165).  Similarly, Chomsky (1989) focuses our attention on the tendencies encouraged by the structure of the arts when, in examining political processes, he states that:

 

case by case, we find that conformity is the easy way, and the path to privilege and prestige; dissidence carries personal costs that may be severe, even in a society that lacks such means of control as death squads, psychiatric prisons, or extermination camps.   The very structure ... is designed to induce conformity to established doctrine (p. 10)

 

As a result of these pressures, more artists are becoming increasingly sensitised to state social-engineering agendas, prompting Gough (p. 163) and others to express concern "that, increasingly, the primary (or even the sole) purpose of art or of its contextualisation in an exhibition is to recommend to the viewer a particular attitude to a particular social situation" (Timms, 1995, p. 4).

 

	Opinion on whether Australia Council has been a
	positive force in arts development (b)
	In general		In own art form
	Agreement	Disagreement	Agreement	Disagreement
Writers	88	4	52	39
Craftspeople	84	3	44	36
Visual artists	81	4	40	42
All artists	82	5	44	40

                (a)  Percentages are of artists who have heard of the Australia Council.

                (b)  Agreement = sum of percentages who 'strongly agree' and 'agree' with the statement

                       that the 'Australia Council has been a positive force in developing the arts/my art

                       form in Australia'.  Disagreement = sum of percentages who 'strongly disagree' and

                       'disagree' with the statement.  Remaining percentages in each case comprise the

                       responses 'neither agree nor disagree' and 'don't know'.

File: G.Hay/lobby/ozcoview.xls

 

Thompson's (1994) "independent" survey of artists.    Part of Table.28 from the report is reproduced in Figure. 4 above.  From this data, Throsby & Thompson (1994) concluded that there was:

 

an overwhelmingly favourable view among artists of the achievements of the Australia Council in general terms in fostering and advancing the arts in Australia, with 82 percent of artists agreeing and only 5 percent disagreeing with the proposition.  When it comes to artists' own art forms, however, opinions are more divided, with only a slender majority of artists agreeing that the Council has been a positive force in their art form over those holding a contrary view (p. 51).

The more intimate the interaction between artists and the Council, the more distrustful artists become, despite generally positive public comments upon receipt of grants.  More politically sensitive data is provided in the appendices of the report, and Figure. 5 is a simplification of Appendix 1 Table 10.3.

 

	Strongly Agree/	Neither Agree nor	Strongly disagree/
	Agree	disagree/Don't Know	Disagree
In General
Panels should be primarily artists	65	12	23
Decisions influenced by politicians	46	39	15
In own art form
Grants offered too much to  too few	45	28	28
Favours 'in-group' in own art form	58	27	16

File: G.Hay/Lobby/Artopino.xls

 

What is apparent from this table is that, while there is a general preference for peer assessment panels, there is also a widely held belief that these panels tend to give too much to too few, favouring an 'in-group' in individual art forms.  These findings are consistent with an élite group of people operating within the arts; a conclusion supported by the chair of the Australia Council who criticised a

 

baby boom generation, who received free education and much else that no other generation ever had, has gone on receiving the lion's share of the funds available for their creative development (McPhee, 1995b).

 

This appears to be because the written, and unwritten, criteria for appointment of professional artists onto the peer assessment panels, and those for making grants to artists, have become too similar.  Not surprisingly, the Council moved rapidly this year to dismantle part of the peer-assessment committee system, without widely consulting the industry.

 

What is perhaps more relevant to this discussion is the large number of professional artists who support Gough's (1995a) criticisms that the Australia Council's decisions are influenced by politicians.  The arts media has been instrumental in promoting this positive perspective of the Australia Council and the grants' system, but at the same time have also been reluctant to explore the political repercussions of an élite capturing the system as a result of the similarity between selection criteria for grants and grants committees.  Until recently, public debate over the nature of state funding of the arts has been only superficially investigated by the public press, while most art publications remain conspicuously silent. 

Certainly, most élite art writers, and their editors, have been reluctant to 'bite the hand that feeds' them by publishing, or writing, too overly critically on the state funding issue.  See Appendix.2 for a list of publications receiving funding.  There are plenty of examples where writers, and others, politically censor themselves, such as Gray (1995) who avoids providing a contemporary Australian example when discussing politically motivated curatorial and museum intervention (p. 25).  In the same journal Throsby, (1995) states that

 

most arts organisations are well aware that sponsorship may, on occasions, bring with it a danger of some real or imagined influence over the organisation's artistic policy.  But that's another story (p. 33).

 

Throsby is unlikely to publicly tell the "story" of the moderating influence of a grant of $135,000 (63 % of income) on the agenda he sets as chair of NAVA (Annual Report 1995).  Neither does he inform us of his conflict of interest in holding this lobby position while being paid by the Council to research and write on the arts (Throsby & Mills, 1989 and Throsby & Thompson, 1994).  The average reader is unaware of this because Throsby is missing from the list of writers, and their biographical information, on the inside cover of that issue of Arts Monthly.  However, it is stressed that:

 

[w]hat is at issue is not the honesty of the opinions expressed or the integrity of those who seek the facts but rather the choice of topics and highlighting of issues, the range of opinion permitted expression, the unquestioned premises that guide reporting and commentary, and the general framework imposed for presentation of a certain view of the world (Chomsky, 1989, p. 12).

 

UNEXPECTED OUTCOMES

There have been a number of unexpected economic outcomes of the arts-state contract.  Professional artists are defined by Throsby & Mills (1989) as artists who have had extensive training and received recent professional recognition via publication, exhibition, engagement or grant (p. 5).  Throsby & Thompson (1995) found that, for this group, art income and total artist income, have declined 14 per cent and 13 per cent respectively, over the period 1986-87 to 1992-93 (Table 21).  Figure. 6 illustrates the trend in average real incomes for visual artists and craftspeople.  "Real" income refers to income after it has been deflated by changes in inflation, giving a better indication of actual purchasing power over time.  Throsby & Thompson also found that professional artists believed that insufficient income was the single

 

File: G. Hay/lobby/artincom.xls

 

most critical factor holding back their careers.  These low and declining levels of income appear to be occurring despite artists being more highly qualified than the average population, having spent an average of four years to obtain their basic arts qualifications (Throsby & Mills, 1989, p. 8-9).  Since these findings are based upon national data, it is suggested that Western Australian professional arts and crafts groups survey their members' art incomes in order to correctly assess the situation here.  Probable causes of insufficient and declining average real income, as the single most important issue facing professional artists today.

 

Yet, despite the arts groups keeping their side of the contract and aligning the arts with state and national cultural objectives, the financial outcomes have been far from outstanding.  It is suggested that the arts' inability to maintain its position of relative strength, in its "contractual exchanges" with the state, has resulted in a decline of the real value of state patronage. 

 

The general perception that federal funding has increased over the last two decades is, in fact, incorrect.  While the state has increased its support of the arts from the 1960s, the real financial value of this has declined because no formula for funding was ever set in the Australia Council Act.  As illustrated in Figure. 7, Federal Government funding of the

 

Figure. 7: Commonwealth funding of the Australia Council(nominal & real values): 1974-94

File: G. Hay/lobby/Ozco-get.xls

                b) Creative Nation Statements

                c)  Reserve Bank of Australia 'Bulletin' for  CPI data

 

Australia Council may have increased from $22m in 1974/5 to $59.2m in 1994/5, but, after inflation, its real value has halved.  This trend is anticipated to continue in the near future.

 

In Western Australia there has been a similar masking of the real level of government arts funding because of the contribution made by the Lotteries Commission to the WADFTA budget.  Figure. 8 illustrates how the Department has been receiving an increasing proportion of its total income from the Lotteries Commission.  If the substantial Lotteries Commission contribution is removed, and the balance adjusted for inflation, a much more modest increase in state funding appears to have occurred over the last two decades (Figure. 9).  In the short term, since 1989-90, there has been a nominal drop of $2 million in state funding, disguised by a $2.5 million increase in funding from the Lotteries Commission.

 

 

 

File: G. Hay/lobby/DFTAgive.xls